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Abortion, or termination of pregnancy, albeit in gradations from most to less 
restrictive to unrestricted, has always been legally allowed in South Africa. This 
questions the need for the introduction of new law. Legalisation of abortion has 
reduced abortion to a form of failed contraception. Illegal abortions motivated new 
law, as well as research, Professor Lourens Marthinus du Plessis’1 constitutional 
argument favouring women’s (reproductive) right to abortion. Yet, illegal abortions 
continue as before democracy when the seemingly Christian, racially-motivated law, 
was flouted by white and black women alike. The Constitution adopts a neutral 
position on the right to life, but is decidedly pro-abortion. This does not imply that a 
constitutional challenge, which has yet to occur, seeking to amend the current status 
quo and to provide protection to an unborn, may be an exercise in futility. This article 
is written in honour of, and analyses the role and early “pro-life” views of the now 
retired Du Plessis as a white Afrikaner male, husband, father and proud grandfather, 
schooled in a traditional, conservative strand of Christianity, and as an anti-apartheid 
constitutional lawyer and drafter – to determine whether his liberal political views are 





Why abortion, why Prof Lourens du Plessis and why me? 
 
                                                          
1 Lourens Marthinus du Plessis (Hons BA (Stellenbosch), B Jur et Comm, LLB, B Phil, LLD 
(PU vir CHO)) has recently formally retired from academia, although he remains an 
Extraordinary Professor of Law at North-West University (Potchefstroom). This article is 
written as a small token in honour of his profound role as my mentor and teacher. Prof Du 
Plessis has always insisted that I address him by his first name – a request I have hitherto 
denied him out of deference to his status. Personal information was obtained informally 
through e-mails and telephonic conversations with him and is used with his permission. 
Afrikaans texts were translated into English to facilitate their understanding. I thank 
Professors J de Ville for his assistance with the translations, and I Leeman for his editorial 
assistance. 




Abortion, or termination of pregnancy, has always been legally “allowed” in 
South Africa, albeit in gradations from most restrictive in terms of the 
common-law, to less restrictive during the operation of the first statute to 
regulate it during apartheid from 1975, namely, the Abortion and Sterilisation 
Act (ASA)2, to unrestricted since 1996, when the ASA was replaced by the 
current statute regulating it, namely, the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act (CTOPA).3 
    What, therefore, motivated me to revisit a topic that may not hold much 
current relevance for many, and, moreover, to do so in the context of a 
protagonist whose early views and publications on abortion may be dated, 
because they were either based on the ASA or interim Constitution (1993)4 
and current Constitution (1996)5 (the Constitution), and did not include the 
CTOPA? I do so for several reasons. 
    I contend that Prof Du Plessis’ last article (1996), which contains his most 
recent interpretations pertaining to abortion, although it was written in a 
purely constitutional context, displayed remarkable political acuity of, 
consciousness of, and grappling with, the fact that “moralities” have to be 
tempered with the “realities” that the ravages of apartheid had left behind as 
a legacy for the majority of South Africa’s impoverished people, when it 
came to the question of “unwanted” (accidental) children or “back-street” 
(illegal) abortions, and which still continue.6 This article, although it provides 
a comprehensive analysis of, and comparison between, Prof Du Plessis’ 
early and later positions on abortion, excludes a review of the CTOPA 
because his position had stopped short of it. However, the CTOPA, unlike 
the ASA, has adopted, and operates within, a convenient trimester 
approach. Although it affords women alone a clear right to request an 
abortion during the first two trimesters, the fact that it makes provision for 
abortion within restricted timeframes may mean that it has not sounded a 
future death-knell for the right of an unborn to life. Hence, reference is briefly 
made to the CTOPA where it may shed light on Prof Du Plessis’ views in a 
current context. 
    Section Three highlights that the ASA legally permitted abortion and was 
deemed liberal by the standards of the apartheid Government that had 
introduced it. A valid question that this article therefore addresses is whether 
it may have been necessary in the first place to have replaced the ASA with 
the CTOPA, or, whether it would have sufficed to have merely amended it. 
Section Three also highlights that both the interim and current Constitutions 
adopt a neutral position on the right to life, and therefore do not guarantee 
women the right to an abortion. Despite the leeway implicit in such a position 
                                                          
2 2 of 1975. 
3 92 of 1996. Enacted on 11 December 1996 and entered into force on 1 February 1997. 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. Effective from 27 April 1994 
until 3 February 1997. 
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. Effective from 4 February 1997. 
6 See Farber “Illegal Abortion Drug Horror” 1 April 2014 Cape Times 1 and 3; and Blackie 
“Fact Sheet on Child Abandonment Research in South Africa” 20 May 2014 National 
Adoption Coalition South Africa http://www.adoptioncoalitionsa.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/05/Fact-Sheet-Research-on-Child-Abandonment-in-South-Africa_Final2.pdf 
(accessed 2015-01-05). 




in the interim Constitution (a position which he had helped to shape), Prof 
Du Plessis interprets the current Constitution as going further by containing 
yet other provisions which clearly favour reproductive health that add to, 
rather than detract from, the right to an abortion. However, the Constitution 
does not guarantee women the right of access to an abortion because it 
treats access as a socio-economic right. Given that the Constitution also 
guarantees the right to freedom of religion and the practice thereof, the 
potential for conflict between this right and other constitutional rights inter se 
remains unavoidable. Section Three broadly examines Du Plessis’ academic 
position on abortion through the lens of his personal life and in a political 
context to better understand his views. It was constructed with the following 
questions in mind: Was he merely a neutral observer imagining that the 
public-law views that he had expressed in the 1970s during apartheid, and 
as an anti-apartheid constitutional lawyer during the drafting of the 1993 
Constitution, were not influenced by his personal experience as a husband, 
and father, and the convictions that he professed to hold? What, if any, was 
the impact of his upbringing in a religiously (Christian), culturally (Afrikaner) 
and politically (white) conservative society on the views he held? Section 
Three also highlights that the Constitutional Court, which has hitherto only 
addressed the right to life in the context of capital punishment, has yet to do 
so in the context of abortion. 
    This article will highlight that Prof Du Plessis not only carried his personal 
(Christian and moral) opinions on abortion close to his heart, but also wore 
his heart on his sleeve when he had the courage of his convictions to 
express, and justify, a pro-life proclivity. However, in doing so, Du Plessis’ 
earlier held pro-life views had earned him harsh criticism from one of his 
postgraduate students, Sarkin7, who had espoused a secular, pro-choice 
view on abortion in a doctorate that was penned under his supervision. In his 
doctorate Sarkin wrote the following in the context of Du Plessis’ first (1990) 
sole-authored article on abortion: 
 
“[While] Du Plessis may aver that ‘pre-natal and post-natal life are both life 
and ought to be respected and protected accordingly,’ … this deserves 
consideration [only] as an opinion … and may well be not only a minority 
opinion but an ill-considered one.”8 
 
    For this reason Section Four examines Prof Du Plessis’ academic position 
with the following questions in mind: Did his research and expertise as an 
“interpreter” of statutes reflect absolutist anti-abortion views, and any 
disingenuous “editing” of texts in favour of life, or did they embody nuanced 
views of tolerance for ambiguity and complexity on the matter of abortion? 
Based on the answers to these questions, I contend that even if Sarkin’s 
criticism were justified, because it was seen in isolation of these contexts 
and other more liberal views expressed by Du Plessis, it may not have been 
entirely objective and may also have been biased by the subjectivities of his 
own personal context. I have, owing to space constraints, only used one of 
                                                          
7 Sarkin The Effect of a Constitution and Bill of Rights on Abortion in South Africa: A 
Comparative Study (LLD Thesis, University of the Western Cape 1992–1995). 
8 Sarkin (LLD Thesis, University of the Western Cape 1992–1995) 316. 




several such references by Sarkin in support of my contention and 
acknowledge the shortcomings of generalising implicit therein. 
    Like Sarkin I too have a similar connection to him. I was the first black 
(using the inclusive term) doctoral student that Du Plessis had supervised 
and he was my first post-apartheid mentor. 
    In broadly ascertaining whether or not Sarkin’s criticism was warranted, 
given that Du Plessis, it appears, had in fact deemed the ASA to be more 
liberal than necessary, I decided to analyse some of Du Plessis’ early views 
in more detail in Sections Four and Five, and do so specifically in the context 
of Christianity in South Africa in Section Five. Section Four interrogates the 
degree to which Du Plessis was pro-life, and considers some of his novel, if 
not radical and controversial, propositions and ideas on life that many 
readers may not be aware of in order to highlight that his being pro-life did 
not necessarily mean he was anti-choice in all cases. 
    Abortion is not a simple “black and white” issue in South Africa and 
remains a contentious religious and legal topic that raises more questions 
than for which there are ready answers. South Africa had, with democracy, 
become a secular state without an official state religion. Nonetheless, 
Section Five highlights that Christianity was the dominant religion during 
apartheid and probably still is. While Du Plessis’ early pro-life and personal 
views on abortion, therefore, may have been influenced by his strong 
affiliation to Christianity, it did not appear to have had an impact on his ability 
to objectively and critically analyse and interpret the “liberal” provisions of 
the ASA, although he may have been personally conflicted in doing so. 
Section Five questions whether Christianity, in the past or currently, can be 
deemed to have really defended or influenced the interpretation of the right 
to life in favour of an unborn in South African law, given that it clearly links 
the start of life to both birth and age. 
    Sections Four and Five also serve to set the context within which to gauge 
whether there were a preserving of, or shifting in, his earlier perspectives on 
abortion, and whether they still resonate as strongly with him now, in the 
twilight years of his life, as they did then in its heyday. Given that I had made 
certain assumptions, and drawn certain conclusions, based on what Du 
Plessis had written, but that I was also uncertain about some of these views, 
I have, instead of speculating, directly engaged Du Plessis on it, the 
outcome of which is detailed in Section Six. 
    Section Seven concludes the article. Of the several important points that it 
raises, two are highlighted. First, while it may appear that, from the point of 
view of both legalisation and the Constitution itself,  there seems to be little 
point for pro-lifers to legally or even constitutionally challenge the right to 
abortion, given that it will more than likely be unsuccessful, since there has 
as yet not been a Constitutional Court challenge which pertains directly to 
abortion and which provides a last word on it, the abortion issue as yet may 
not have been decided “once and for all” as many believe it has. Secondly, it 
remains necessary to interpret the provisions of the Constitution (albeit 
implicit) in support of the right to abortion because of a fact that Du Plessis 
had more than a decade ago already alerted us to, namely, that the 
“prosperity gap” between the 20% rich (overwhelmingly white) and the 80% 




poor population in South Africa has not been closing fast enough since the 
advent of democracy.9 
 
2 PROF DU PLESSIS  IN  SUPPORT  OF  A  WOMAN’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHT  TO  ABORTION 
 
South Africans had held opposing views on abortion during the operation of 
the ASA. This was highlighted and clarified by Du Plessis in 1990 and 1991 
as follows: 
 
“[T]here are those who advocate a so-called liberalization of abortion 
legislation … so that medically safe abortions will be available more freely- 
and perhaps even on demand … Public opinion ... seems to favour lawful 
abortion on the grounds presently provided for by the [ASA] and is against 
abortion for socio-economic reasons.10 … [H]owever, the results of certain 
opinion surveys seem to indicate support for the “liberalization” of abortion 
legislation.”11 
 
    Large numbers12 of illegal abortions may have been touted as a main 
motivating factor for introducing the CTOPA. In 1996 Du Plessis had 
proffered a Christian assessment of abortion in the context of the 
Constitution which indicated support for the need to introduce the right to 
abortion: 
 
“To many Christians in South Africa fetal life is of such fundamental religious 
significance that they cannot accept that an abortion can be procured in 
circumstances other than an emergency. I, for one, respect this view because 
I also revere fetal life. However, people holding this view will have to advance 
credible (and workable) solutions to the following two real problems: 
1. Who is to care for and raise "unwanted" children born into a situation of 
poverty and misery? 
2. How are we to deal with the evil of ‘backstreet abortions’ which kill or do 
serious bodily and mental harm to many thousands of women each year? 
Problems such as these lay a foundation for cogent constitutional arguments 
in favour of women's right to a (safe) abortion.”13 
 
    As pro-life as Du Plessis indicated that he then still was, he appears to 
give an indication that he may have had a change of heart, and that his view 
may no longer be as firmly rooted in Christianity as it had been prior to that. I 
base my assumption on the fact that Du Plessis had in 1990 clearly 
articulated support for a pro-life view when he not only referred to an unborn 
as a “human being”, but also advanced the argument that every unborn be 
given the right to a start to life that would include forming part of a family, 
whether wanted or unwanted. Was this a “Freudian slip” or a matter of 
                                                          
9 Du Plessis “The Future of South Africa: Perspectives of Integrating Different Cultures – 
Means of Law” 2002 6 Rechtspolitisches Forum 5. 
10 Du Plessis “Jurisprudential Reflections on the Status of Unborn Life” 1990 1 TSAR 48. 
11 Du Plessis “Reflecting on Law, Morality and Communal Mores (With Particular Reference to 
the Protection of Pre-natal Life)” 1991 56(3) Koers 347. 
12 Sarkin (LLD Thesis, University of the Western Cape 1992–1995) 63. 
13 Du Plessis “A Christian Assessment of Aspects of the Bill of Rights in South Africa's Final 
Constitution” 1996 96 Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 72–73. 




terminological semantics on the part of Du Plessis, given that it was (and still 
is) technically incorrect to refer to an unborn as “human”? 
 
“Has the foetus not got an own standing in (for example) the family into which 
it is to be born? ... Birth is the fulfilment of one of the most vital expectations of 
the foetus … Birth is not the beginning of life; it is simply a drastic switch in 
lifestyle … I am, to say the least, uneasy about some of the [ASA] grounds 
[which go beyond necessity] on which a lawful abortion can be procured … 
‘Once the sanctity of human life is degraded, society stands at the top of a 
slippery slope that could lead to abortion on demand (of the mother) [and] ... 
abortion on command (of the State) …’”14. 
 
    What I did initially find surprising is why Du Plessis had not included the 
CTOPA within the ambit of his article, given that the Constitution came into 
operation just three days before the CTOPA which must therefore, at least, 
have been available in Bill form. Furthermore, in the previous year (1995), 
Du Plessis had completed the supervision of Sarkin’s doctorate on abortion, 
although it was based on the interim Constitution and finalised before both 
the current Constitution and the CTOPA. 
    Although Du Plessis may have overlooked the latest developments with 
regard to the CTOPA because his attention was occupied with more 
pressing matters, he nevertheless kept himself connected to the topic. Du 
Plessis had supervised both Sarkin and me at more or less the same time 
between 1993 and 1996 when South Africa was busy transitioning from 
apartheid to democracy, and he was destined to play an instrumental role in 
shaping the neutral position on the right to life provision (and therefore 
abortion) in South Africa’s first justiciable Bill of Rights contained in the 
interim Constitution. Section Three investigates Du Plessis’ role in this 
process and the conflict within the Constitution itself. 
 
3 DU PLESSIS AND THE ASA IN HISTORICAL, 
PERSONAL, POLITICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
JUDICIAL  CONTEXTS 
 
With the advent of democracy in South Africa in 1994 came the end of 46 
years (since 1948) of apartheid rule by the minority, all white, Afrikaner- 
dominated National Party (NP) Government. Given a context of Dutch and 
British colonial rule, the NP’s following included most of the Dutch 
descended Afrikaners and many English-speaking whites. The African 
National Congress (ANC) has been the ruling power ever since. 
    Du Plessis reminds us that “[a]partheid … was the social experiment of a 
‘Christian government’ which, in its laws, clearly favoured Christianity …”15 
Further, that it was through the collaborative effort of three Reformed 
Afrikaans churches, which included the Dutch Reformed Church, which both 
shaped and formulated the theological justification given to apartheid.16 
                                                          
14 Du Plessis 1990 1 TSAR 58. 
15 Du Plessis 1996 96 Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 74. 
16 Du Plessis and Gouws “The Relationship Between Political Tolerance and Religion: The 
Case of South Africa” 2000 14(2) Emory International LR 660. 




Although this may partly explain the restrictive nature of abortion law during 
the operation of both the common law and the ASA, I contend in Section 
Five that Christianity may in fact have had very little to do with it. 
    Prior to, and until, the enactment of the ASA, abortion in South Africa had 
not been statutorily defined. Hence guidance as to what exactly it was that 
abortion law entailed had to be sought from South Africa’s Roman-Dutch 
common law and case law. The common law had severely restricted 
abortion and considered it to be a crime, albeit with one exception (defence 
of necessity) – a therapeutic abortion was legally allowed only if medically 
the life of the mother was in danger and had to be saved.17 
    The ASA was intended to clarify the application of the common law.18 
Although the expectation was high that the ASA be a progressive law,19 
Hawthorne20 pointed out that its aim was deemed to be to protect the 
“potential” life of the foetus against its killing. 
    Professor Du Plessis married his wife, Wilhelmina, in 1971 and fathered 
three daughters born in 1974, 1975 and 1979. In 1973, the NP Government 
appointed an “all white”, male only Commission of Inquiry21 to review the 
problem of abortion in South Africa. In 1974 it favourably considered its 
recommendations, and in 1975 it enacted the ASA. 
    Abortion remained illegal22 and the ASA provided for several categories of 
offences. However, it retained the common-law therapeutic exception23, and 
extended the circumstances for allowing an abortion to include eugenic24 
and humanitarian25 considerations.26 It did so with no time restrictions and 
therefore made no distinction as to the “age” of an unborn. Viability (ability of 
a foetus to independently survive outside the uterus or womb of its mother) 
therefore appears not to have played as crucial a role in abortion legislation 
in South Africa prior to its legalisation as it currently does. However, as will 
be detailed in Sections Five, although “foetus” has not been defined in the 
ASA, and is not classified as a person in terms of South African law until its 
birth, this does not mean that a foetus was (as is still the case) necessarily 
without protection. 
    Hawthorne27 pointed out that the mere existence of the ASA provided a 
sufficient basis for the protection of the rights of prospective fathers. Was it 
therefore surprising that Du Plessis, who had fathered two daughters during 
                                                          
17 Hawthorne The Crime of Abortion: A Historical and Comparative Study (Unpublished LLD 
Thesis, University of Pretoria 1982) 223–224 and 237. 
18 Hawthorne (Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria 1982) 238. 
19 Strauss “Therapeutic Abortion and South African Law” 1968 85 SALJ 459. 
20 Hawthorne (Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria 1982) 252. 
21 Sarkin-Hughes and Sarkin-Hughes “Choice and Informed Request: The Answer to Abortion: 
A Proposal for South African Abortion Reform” 1990 1 Stell LR 373. 
22 S 2. 
23 S 3(1)(a) and (b). 
24 S 3(1)(c). An abortion is permitted if the pregnancy would end in the birth of an infant with a 
severe mental or physical abnormality. 
25 S 3(1)(d). An abortion is permitted if the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 
26 S 3(1)(a)–(e). 
27 Hawthorne (Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of Pretoria 1982) 278. 




the period that the ASA was being considered and reviewed, viewed the 
matter of liberalisation differently (conservatively) when he wrote of the ASA 
that 
 
“[a] true liberalization of abortion legislation will be directed at the increased 
protection of the foetus's basic right to live‒not at its increased subversion”.28 
 
    In 1977, shortly after the enactment of the ASA, Du Plessis was part of 
the Christian voice “that questioned the basic tenets of apartheid”.29 
Furthermore, in 1987 and 1989, Du Plessis was intimately involved with 
having discussions with members of the then banned ANC. During the 
transitional period leading up to and following the first democratic elections 
in April 1994, South Africa was governed by the interim Constitution. It was 
therefore not surprising that Du Plessis played a fundamental role in this 
process. Du Plessis opined that the interim Constitution had brought with it 
the end of “an era of privileging certain understandings of the Christian 
faith”.30 In 1993, he was appointed Convenor of the Technical Committee on 
Fundamental Rights which was responsible for drafting South Africa's first 
Bill of Rights during the transition to democracy at the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Process in Kempton Park.31 Although Du Plessis32 points out 
that generous provision was made for the protection of an “impressive 
catalogue” of human rights in the Bill of Rights, the interim Constitution, 
which was “[t]he product of intense negotiation”, did not deal with the 
question of abortion because of disagreement between the negotiators. In 
seeking to reach a compromise between the two opposing views on 
abortion, the Constitution makers adopted a neutral position on the right to 
life in both Constitutions: 
    Section 9 of the interim Constitution simply stated that “[e]very person 
shall have the right to life”, while section 11 of the current Constitution states 
that “[e]veryone has the right to life”. 
    Neither Constitution therefore expressly provides for the right to an 
abortion on request. 
    Du Plessis had pointed out that the interim Constitution also paved the 
way for the current Constitution.33 The neutral position had continued 
unchanged in the Constitution because, as indicated by Du Plessis, “[t]he 
constitution-makers avoided dealing with abortion as a predominantly right to 
life (or an exception to the right to life) issue”.34 Given its controversial nature 
                                                          
28 Du Plessis 1990 1 TSAR 59. 
29 Eloff “Keynote Address: A Tribute to a Man who Served his Country and Humanity 
(Message on the occasion of the presentation of an honorary doctorate to Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu on 27 November 2002)” 2003 68(1) Koers 8. 
30 Du Plessis “Freedom of or Freedom from Religion? An Overview of Issues Pertinent to the 
Constitutional Protection of Religious Rights and Freedom in ‘the New South Africa’” 2001 2 
Brigham Young University LR 442. 
31 Du Plessis and Corder Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) v. 
32 Du Plessis 2001 2 Brigham Young University LR 440–441. 
33 Du Plessis 2001 2 Brigham Young University LR 440. 
34 Du Plessis 1996 96 Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 72. 




it was deemed to be the “Solomonic solution”,35 that is, a middle course 
between the retention and the abolition thereof. However, Albie Sachs,36 of 
the ANC constitutional committee, may have given better expression to what 
this really meant when he stated that those against abortion will not have a 
right to impose positions on others with different (presumably pro-choice) 
opinions. 
    Du Plessis writes that whilst the abortion debate was more focused on the 
“desirability” of the law as it then stood up until the interim Constitution and 
its Bill of Rights, with the latter’s commencement it was inevitable that the 
focus would shift to its “constitutionality”.37 
    The “tug-of-war” that had ensued between “minimalists” (mainly the ANC) 
negotiators and “optimalists” over the matter had eventually resulted in a 
compromise with the ANC negotiators who made it quite clear from the 
outset that abortion was for them one of those issues that could only be 
settled in a final Bill of Rights that was drafted by a truly representative 
body.38 However, this is to be questioned, because what eventually did 
transpire was “that the matter [was] … decided not so much by the 
(constitutional) court but through ‘legislative action after democratic 
discussion in future’”.39 This also goes a long way towards explaining why 
the CTOPA (which legalised abortion) preceded the Constitution (neutral 
position on abortion), and why it was not even necessary for the ASA, which 
essentially proscribes abortion, to be given the death-knell by a 
constitutional or judicial challenge. 
    Both Constitutions had adopted a neutral position on abortion when they 
made equal provision for the rights of a woman to privacy,40 reproductive 
freedom and physical integrity and the State’s duty to protect the developing 
life41 that she carries. 
    Du Plessis wrote that “[t]he constitutionality of capital punishment or of 
legislation permitting abortion largely depends on the limitability … of the 
right to life”.42 The limitation clause (section 33(1)(b)) of the interim 
Constitution) provided for a limitation of each right contained in the Bill of 
Rights, including the right to life, only if such limitation did “not negate its 
essential content”. The then Chief Justice, Corbett, in a memorandum 
submitted on behalf of the judiciary of South Africa on the Draft Interim Bill of 
Rights, had therefore appeared to suggest that both the death penalty and 
abortion were to be prohibited. Du Plessis highlighted that this may well be 
true, based purely on a literal interpretation of the clause. However, his pro-
life view, which would have favoured such an exacting position, did not cloud 
his expert judgment as an interpreter of statutes as is evident from his 
                                                          
35 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 22. 
36 Sachs Protecting Human Rights in a New South Africa (1990) 68. 
37 Du Plessis “Whither Capital Punishment and Abortion under South Africa’s Transitional 
Constitution?” 1994 7(2) SACJ 145. 
38 Du Plessis 1994 7(2) SACJ 146–147. 
39 Du Plessis 1994 7(2) SACJ 162. 
40 S 13 and 14 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, respectively. 
41 S 9 and 11 of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions, respectively. 
42 Du Plessis 1994 7(2) SACJ 148. 




comment43 on the Chief Justice’s view which did not deem the limitation 
clause to rule out the possibility of abortion. 
    Du Plessis had predicted that, if the Constitutional Court were to take its 
cue from private law, it would probably not recognise the foetus as a legal 
subject worthy of constitutional protection.44 However, during the period of 
the operation of the interim Constitution, the Constitutional Court in S v 
Makwanyane,45 the first case since its inception, abolished the death 
penalty. It had therefore considered the right to life in the context of capital 
punishment and not abortion. 
    Several other provisions in the current Constitution clearly conflict with this 
neutral position because it also grants a pregnant woman the right to 
reproductive autonomy, and therefore comes very close to providing a 
woman with a right to abortion which overrides the rights of the unborn that 
she is carrying. For example, section 12(2)(a) explicitly recognises the right 
to make decisions concerning reproduction as part of the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity. By specifically guaranteeing the reproductive rights 
and health of women, this section goes further than the interim Constitution. 
Hence, Du Plessis46 opined, with regard to section 12(2), that: 
 
“strengthened by the recognition, in [its] paragraph (b), of everyone’s ‘right ... 
to security in and control over their body … [that] [t]he conclusion that the final 
Constitution does provide for women’s effectual right to have an abortion thus 
seems to be unavoidable … Section 12(2) must thus be understood as 
permitting optimal access by choice to the means for terminating a pregnancy 
in the most humane way. The section 7(2) duty of the state to promote and 
fulfill, amongst others, women's rights, read with the entrenchment of the right 
to health care services in section 27(1)(a), moreover strongly indicate that 
abortion services will have to be made available to indigent women by the 
state.” 
 
    The human rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute. Section 
7(3) provides that “[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the 
limitations contained or referred to in Section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill”. 
Thus, the section 27(1)(a) right to access health-care services is dependent 
on the availability of State resources (section 27(2)), and may therefore be 
limited, in terms of section 36 (general limitation clause), where these are 
deficient or lacking. Is it then not logical to conclude, that from the State’s 
perspective, the right to an abortion literally boils down to a “request” and not 
a “demand”? 
    In terms of the interpretation clause (section 39 (1)(a) of the Constitution) 
of the Constitution, South Africa is only obliged to apply the provisions of 
international United Nations (UN) instruments once it has ratified them. 
    Although the right to an abortion may be inferred from it, the Constitution 
does not contain a clear right to abortion, nor does it guarantee access to an 
                                                          
43 See Du Plessis 1994 7(2) SACJ 152–153. 
44 Du Plessis 1994 7(2) SACJ 162. 
45 S v Makwanyane supra par 22. Mahomed J, (par 268) and O’Regan J, (par 326), in their 
respectively separate judgments concurring with Chaskalson P, in this matter, ruminated on 
some of the (interim) constitutional implications of abortion. 
46 Du Plessis 1990 1 TSAR 72–73. 




abortion. Although the interpretation clause (section 39(1)(a) and (b)) of the 
Constitution uses imperative language when it states that a court “must 
consider international law” when interpreting the Bill of Rights, this 
consideration does not mean that it is obliged to “apply” the provisions of 
international human-rights instruments, unless South Africa has also ratified 
them. South Africa has ratified a range of United Nations (UN) instruments, 
for example, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified in 
1995.47 Yet, the CRC does not guarantee children that basic, yet necessary, 
right to a “start” to life itself that Du Plessis deemed crucial. While it signed 
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
ICESCR in 1994, and had already ratified the ICCPR in 1998, the South 
African Government has ratified the ICESCR only as recently as January 
2015. It is contended that the reason for the delay in ratifying the ICESCR 
may have been related to the creation of further financial expectations from, 
and strain on, State resources. Furthermore, little reliance or further 
guidance can be obtained from the provisions of the ICCPR: for example, 
see Article 6(1) for an interpretation contrary to that of section 11 (right to 
life) of the Constitution. 
    A further conflict is evident in yet another important constitutional 
provision, namely, section 15(1) which provides that “everyone has the right 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion”. This 
provision appears to be wide enough to be invoked by all interested parties 
who may raise valid objections to abortion, including objectors who may 
voice moral objections or theorise about them, but who can safely, and even 
hypocritically, ignore these views in their private lives. 
    Yet, the Constitution is expected to provide interpretative guidance with 
regard to ambiguous or conflicting provisions within the CTOPA, and to do 
so in spite its own conflicting provisions in this regard. 
    While it was understandable that the ANC would want to review all 
apartheid legislation, one may in hindsight, question why the ANC deemed it 
necessary to choose to repeal the ASA which allowed abortion, given that in 
doing so it did not mean that it would prevent a judicial challenge, and 
whether this may have had anything to do with the fact that “[o]verall there 
were more “pro-life” than “pro-choice” submissions” that were made to the 
Ad Hoc Committee on Abortion and Sterilisation48 which reviewed the ASA, 
which therefore had to have been discounted. 
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4 HOW FAR DID PROF LOURENS DU PLESSIS’ 
EARLY VIEWS AND INTERPRETATIONS ON 
ABORTION GO IN DEFENCE  OF  LIFE  AND  GOD? 
 
(i) A mother-to-be trading in her life for that of her 
unborn? 
 
It may be inferred from a 1978 article (among his earliest although co-
authored) that as a jurist Du Plessis was supportive, amidst a very 
restrictively held pro-life view, of a “pro-choice” view being exercised in 
favour of the life of an unborn over that of its mother when an emergency 
warranted a therapeutic abortion: 
 
“abortion should under all circumstances be punished as a form of murder; ... 
the only ground of justification which should be recognised (legally and 
otherwise) for abortion in the event of an emergency, is a threat to the life or 
health of the mother (but even here it should still be left to the mother and 
other interested parties to make a choice).”49 
 
    It is contended that the view of affording the mother (“and other interested 
parties”, presumably the husband and doctor-provider) the right to choose to 
forego her own life to save that of her child, although remarkably progressive 
for its time, will garner little support and goes far beyond the “choice” to abort 
currently offered to women by the CTOPA, and may for this reason be 
constitutionally limited. Furthermore, his view is also controversial because 
of the ethical question it raises as to just how far Du Plessis’ early position 
was really in defence of life and God. This is therefore further interrogated 
with him in paragraph 6 below. 
    It is logically expected that, if the pregnancy (foetus) threatens the life of 
the mother-to-be, a doctor, whether or not he or she may invoke section 
15(1) of the Constitution as a defence in objecting to performing an abortion, 
will be duty-bound to choose “the” life of the mother over “a” potential human 
life and provide an abortion as an emergency service when saving the 
woman’s life, or preventing further harm to it, is at stake. This is logically 
inferred from the fact that the mother’s life would be deemed the more 
valuable of the two. Abortion is not a form of murder.50 
    Although objecting providers may be able to invoke section 15, or even 
section 23(1) (unfair labour practice) of the Constitution, their right to object 
may be limited by section 36 of the Constitution when compelling medical 
cases or emergencies necessitate that abortions be performed.51 While an 
abortion based on eugenic grounds is seen as a means by which the State 
is able to protect both a woman’s health and her life itself, Du Plessis’ view 
suggests that women may opt to forfeit both these protections in favour of 
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the life and health of her unborn. While Du Plessis may accord a very high 
priority to the sanctity of life, he distinguishes between a life that is worthy of 
protection and one that is not. Therefore, valid questions that can be asked 
are: How really different is the “source” or “origin” of the life of the mother 
and that of her unborn?  How is her life any less sacred, and taking it any 
less than murder, even when it is her personal choice to give it up? 
 
(ii) Conception and contraception: interpreting the ASA 
to treat the unborn as more or less human? 
 
In 2013, the then Minister of Health expressed the view that young girls are 
“using abortion as contraception”, which confirms that abortion had become 
a form of failed contraception in South Africa.52 However, an interpretation of 
the ASA meant that the reverse was possible, that is, that contraception was 
a form of abortion. The ASA does not make any legal distinction between an 
early or late abortion on the basis of the “age” of an unborn. Thus, actions 
that either complied with the “definition” of abortion, or abortions which did 
not meet with the requirements of the ASA, were both deemed to be equally 
criminal. However, there were subtle variations in the respective translations 
of the definition of abortion in the English (official) and Afrikaans versions of 
the ASA. Section 1 in the official version, which is of interpretative value, 
created ambiguity53 when it defined abortion as “the abortion of a live foetus 
of a woman with intent to kill such a foetus”. 
    In doing so it confounded matters because it did not meet the necessary 
standard expected of a definition, and could therefore allude to life either 
starting early with conception (that is, when the female ovum is fertilised by 
male sperm to form a zygote), or later with implantation (that is, after the 
zygote becomes implanted in the uterus or womb of the woman as an 
embryo). In this definition the term “abortion” was inadvertently used to 
explain what was meant by it and therefore essentially defied its purpose. 
The translation of key words in the definition therefore had significant 
interpretative implications for either “editing” the right to life in or out, which 
proved problematic for Du Plessis’ pro-life views, but which he as a jurist 
was duty-bound to solve through rational interpretation of the law. 
    The English definition of abortion brought Du Plessis face to face with 
interpretational challenges presented by the practical use of the 
“contraceptive”, namely, the intrauterine device (IUD), because it raised 
ethical questions about the beginning of life. If therefore life began with 
conception, as many pro-lifers speculate it does, then it was also a real fact 
that the IUD did not prevent conception, but merely prevented the 
implantation which occurs after conception. Strauss argued that, although 
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“technically” an IUD was an abortifacient, that legally its use did not amount 
to an unlawful abortion.54 
    Similarly, Du Plessis 55 argued that using an IUD was not prohibited by the 
ASA because the Act, strictly speaking, protected the point of implantation 
and not the point of conception. In support of this view, Du Plessis deemed 
the Afrikaans version of section 1 as providing more clarity, and giving a 
better indication of the type of abortion that the Act intended to invalidate: 
 
“vrugafdrywing is die afdrywing [expulsion or removal] van ’n lewende vrug 
van ’n vrou met die opset om dit te dood”. 
 
    Logically, this confirms that the ASA was “liberal” and that Du Plessis, 
however, “pro-life” he deemed himself to be, did not support the protection of 
life from the moment of conception. However, Du Plessis believed that pro-
lifers may be taking life too far when they deem an abortion that occurs 
spontaneously (miscarriage) to still be an abortion. 
    Today, given legalisation, using contraceptives like the IUD is hardly an 
issue. The definition of “termination of pregnancy” in section 1 of the CTOPA 
requires implantation and refers to an abortion that is purposely induced, 
rather than one that occurs spontaneously (miscarriage) as follows: 
 
“means the separation and expulsion, by medical [through drugs] or surgical 
[through instrumentation] means, of the contents of the uterus of a pregnant 
woman”. 
 
    There is a clear indication in both the ASA56 and the CTOPA57 that a 
foetus is capable of suffering severe physical or mental abnormality, and 
sustaining injury (ASA). Given that currently a medical abortion (by surgical 
means) may be delayed because it may be initiated only once a foetus is 
detected, there is no such thing as a “quick” abortion. Specialist doctors in 
South Africa are currently also performing open (intra-uterine) foetal surgery 
in terms of which the uterus is opened and the foetus is exposed (as in a 
caesarean section birth). However, the foetus remains dependent on the 
placenta (life line which connects it to the mother), and is either returned to 
the uterus or birth takes place. Doctors are literally opening a window to life 
in the womb in order to avert pain and suffering to a growing foetus and give 
it a greater chance of a normal life. This begs the question whether these 
advancements, given that the unborn may in some cases be partially 
delivered (while remaining attached to its mother) and returned to the womb, 
do not also mean that the “moment” that life starts may yet have to be 
reviewed or revised in South Africa? It does, however, appear that, 
according to the widely accepted definition of “live birth” by the UN World 
Health Organisation (WHO), only a foetus that is completely expelled from 
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its mother’s body, even if still attached to the mother’s body via the umbilical 
cord, will be considered to comply therewith.58 
 
5 DID CHRISTIANITY HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW PERTAINING TO 
ABORTION, ON WHEN LIFE STARTS, AND ON THE 
PROTECTION OF THE UNBORN? 
 
Christianity, as is borne out by the population censuses taken just prior to 
democracy in 1991 (76.9%),59 and thereafter in 1996 (75.5%) and 2001 
(79.8%),60 held a clear majority position among religions in South Africa. The 
latest (2011) census, however, excludes religion as a consideration and 
therefore it can only be speculated that Christianity is still the dominant 
religion. 
    Although the ASA equally applied to, and discriminated against, all 
women regardless of their race, it nonetheless on more than one count 
discriminated between black and white women, given the latter’s preferred 
racial and class hierarchy over all other women. 
    The NP Government discouraged white women from seeking legal 
abortions, and through incentives, like tax perks, encouraged the growth of 
the minority white population.61 In fact: 
 
“While most religious groups in South Africa opposed legalization of abortion, 
the Dutch Reformed Church … not only opposed the new law but propagated 
the belief that the white population must grow to maintain its supremacy … By 
contrast, contraception was promoted for black … women.”62 
 
    A blind eye was also turned to black African transgressors of the ASA and 
its common-law predecessor in the hope of stemming the growth of an 
already burgeoning majority black, African population.63 Ironically, white 
women were able to secure legal abortions locally based on psychiatric64 
grounds (which accounted for the most abortions), or go abroad to countries 
of colonial origin like England and the Netherlands, if they could afford to do 
so.65 
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    According to the common law, a person is legally deemed to come into 
existence at birth. Hence, in terms of South African law, legal subjectivity 
only starts at birth. Legal personality therefore begins when the birth is 
complete, that is, when the child is separated from its mother and is 
breathing.66 Although protective legal measures exist in both the common 
law and statutory law to safeguard the interests of the unborn, support for 
the definition of a child as a person under the age of 18 years is found in the 
Constitution67 and the Children’s Act.68 Both link the definition of “a child” to 
age. That the law had, during apartheid, not formally accorded the foetus 
any legal status until it had been born was probably acceptable, given that 
abortion was illegal and that therefore an unborn had a greater chance of 
survival than it would currently have. The law then, as now, also provided 
additional protection to an unborn. For example, the nasciturus fiction, in 
terms of which an unborn is deemed to have already been born when it is to 
its advantage, would help an unborn, if subsequently born alive, to secure its 
interests in matters pertaining to succession. However, nothing would, for 
example, legally preclude an unscrupulous mother-to-be from entirely 
circumventing its application by furtively seeking an abortion in order to 
stand a better chance of augmenting her own share of the inheritance. 
 
(i) Du Plessis on the nasciturus fiction and the 
disadvantaged  foetus 
 
Although indicating that the ASA did not make provision for any ring-fencing 
of the moment of life, Du Plessis already in 1978 had regarded the common-
law position that legal subjectivity only starts with live birth as archaic: 
 
“In this respect our law is obsolete. The origin of life is today no longer tied to 
a mysterious connection between body and soul. Why can our law then not 
make use of modern medico-scientific tools to define its own moment of 
life?”69 
 
    It would therefore appear that for Du Plessis the fact that life may clinically 
also begin with “brain birth”, in terms of the latest research, would have been 
a serious consideration. 
    In 1976 Du Plessis,70 in one of the first articles in which he briefly 
mentions abortion, pointed out that the reason why the foetus was 
disadvantaged by the nasciturus rule was simply because the premise upon 
which its operation depends, namely, subsequent live birth, is not present 
because of an abortion. 
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    Du Plessis was critical of the judgment in Christian League of South Africa 
v Rall71 which held that the nasciturus rule could not be invoked to found a 
right to prevent a lawful abortion under the ASA. 
    In two similar articles written by Du Plessis in 1990 and 1991,72 it 
becomes evident that Du Plessis did not see the requirement of “live birth” 
as an insurmountable obstacle. The 1991 article highlights that he was 
positively reliant on a Christian consciousness which he felt must be used to 
persuade the then Christian majority of the preciousness of pre-natal life. In 
both articles he expressed the view that the South African law was woefully 
remiss in providing sufficient protection to the unborn, and that the time had 
arrived to consider two amendments to the law. First, he recommended 
according legal subjectivity and personality to the foetus through an 
extension of the nasciturus rule as a possible “preventive protection” 
measure. Secondly, in what could probably be considered by many to be an 
extreme and unaffordable measure, he suggested that the ASA be amended 
to provide that every application for an abortion be heard in judicial 
proceedings, in which an unborn is represented by a curator ad litem. While 
his second argument highlighted that he believed that abortion should be 
made more difficult to obtain, and that more protection ought to be afforded 
to a foetus, he was aware of the limitations of his argument that can be 
inferred from his own words in the 1990 article that “[t]he attitude[s] of South 
African jurists to existing abortion laws vary”.73 
 
(ii) Du Plessis on linking the ASA to the lawful abortion 
of an unborn of mixed race 
 
According to Strauss, the reference in the ASA to the contravention of the 
Immorality Act 23 of 1957 in defining a legal indication for an abortion which 
pertained to the foetus having been conceived in unlawful (later amended to 
illegitimate) intercourse, 
 
“had given rise to a fallacy that conception of a foetus in consensual ‘Black-
White’ immorality now constitutes an indication for abortion”.74 
 
    Not so, according to Du Plessis’ interpretation thereof: 
 
“This question becomes similarly topical when we venture into the field of 
sexual offences: should adultery be a crime in our law and if so, on which 
grounds … to which extent should (which forms of) abortion be prohibited by 
sanction … in our Immorality Act … and then especially section 26 thereof 
which prohibit acts of immorality between White and non-White [; is it] in all 
respects tenable and defensible?”75 
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    The Immorality Act was repealed by the Immorality and Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Amendment Act 72 of 1985, which finally lifted the 
prohibition of sexual relations between interracial couples. However, Du 
Plessis had raised a valid question in the quotation cited above: Whether 
during the time that this legislation was still in operation, given the period of 
its overlap with the ASA, did this not mean that it also justified a further, 
albeit racially-based and “immoral”, legal basis to procure an abortion in 
terms of the ASA which the apartheid Government would have been legally 
obliged to condone? This implied that it was a racist law, given that it was 
possible to justify its use to deprive an unborn of life purely on the basis of its 
“mixed” race. 
 
(iii) Du Plessis on other “pro-life” legislation? 
 
Du Plessis76 had mentioned two early examples in South African law 
(pertaining to maternity leave and pregnant women facing the death 
sentence or being imprisoned) that suggest that it favoured a pro-life 
approach and protected unborn life. The execution of the death sentence of 
a pregnant woman was delayed until after she had given birth, and special 
provision was made for the release of prisoners with advanced pregnancies. 
However, I contend that currently this is no longer the case because, 
although the death penalty may have subsequently been abolished, female 
prisoners can still access abortion, and unequal maternity and paternity 
benefits still exist as patriarchal constructs. 
    The equality clause (section 9) of the Constitution takes cognisance of the 
different biological roles of men and women in relation to reproduction by 
preventing discrimination on the ground of pregnancy. 
    Regulations currently do not make it possible for “inmates” (previously 
“prisoners”) in South Africa to have an abortion on request during the first 
trimester in terms of the CTOPA at State expense.77 While it may therefore 
seem that an unborn is protected during this period, I contend that this is not 
so. It would appear that the Constitution,78 in addition to its equality 
provision, also permits inmates to consult with, and be attended to, by their 
own private medical practitioners at their own cost, and therefore provides 
women with a loophole, and a means with which to obtain a first trimester 
abortion with a doctor’s assistance; and neither could be found guilty of 
having transgressed the CTOPA or the Correctional Services Act. Further, 
that an inmate will probably stand a better chance of having a safe abortion 
than a poor black woman living in a township who has to resort to an illegal 
abortion or abortificants. 
    Du Plessis also opined that the fact that statutory provision is made for 
maternity leave, can be seen as a positive measure by the State in favour of 
protecting the life of an unborn. However, I contend that this is only a start 
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and not enough. Section 25 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act79 
makes provision for four months’ maternity leave for new mothers. Fathers 
have to rely on Section 27 of the same Act, which gives anyone three days 
of paid family-responsibility leave in a year, when a child is born. This is an 
indication of the marginal value attached to the roles of a father, and the 
State in ridding society of patriarchal constructs. 
 
6 RECENT RUMINATIONS WITH DU PLESSIS ABOUT 
HIS  VIEWS 
 
The following are some of the thoughts that Prof Du Plessis has shared with 
me, interspersed with my own analysis thereof. 
    Although it appears from Du Plessis’ last publication on abortion in 1996 
that his view of both abortion and organised religion has “softened”, it does 
not spell theological fatigue, a change of heart or even indifference to both. 
This is unremarkable because there is not only one strand of Christianity that 
is right. Du Plessis deemed the ASA to be too liberal and the defences that it 
had introduced as too broad. Yet the then status quo must at least have 
given Du Plessis some sense of control over the situation because the ASA 
afforded him an assurance of fatherhood in ways that the CTOPA does not 
do for men today, given that it assures women alone of a choice to abort. 
    That he was able to have children made the fact that they were all girls 
irrelevant because today Du Plessis is the proud grandfather of 
grandchildren, including grandsons. They were all born after democracy and 
the legalisation of abortion, and therefore a thought that does give him cause 
for concern is the fact that any one of them could have been aborted at a 
daughter’s volition, and that he would have been powerless to do anything 
about it. 
    I questioned Du Plessis about the contradictory radicalism implicit in the 
very conservative anti-abortion view expressed in his 1978 publication. He 
conceded that an unborn in such an (emergency) case also has to be born 
wanted. A similar view is confirmed in his 1996 publication with regard to 
abandoned and unwanted children. 
    Du Plessis is still sympathetic to a pro-life view, and although he is, by his 
own admission, not a good defender of pro-choice; he is no longer 
absolutely or even inflexibly anti-abortion, especially in cases where there is 
little room for manoeuvre. A typical example would be the emergency 
situation, where the life of the mother-to-be is in danger and needs to be 
saved. In view of the circumstances and the fact that there is nothing else 
that can be done about the situation, he will agree that the abortion is 
necessary to save the mother’s life. At the same time, Du Plessis still largely 
resonates with the radical “pro-choice” view advocated in 1978, which 
affords a mother-to-be the choice to trade in her life for that of her unborn in 
such an emergency situation. While this may seem contradictory, he still 
respects her choice to do so. 
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    Ultimately, Du Plessis believes that the choice that anyone exercises 




The apartheid ASA, paradoxically, did not confer all rights on an unborn. 
Although it had little to do with Christianity and permitted abortion, the fact 
that it had policed abortion through law may have made it more acceptable 
to those South Africans who favoured a pro-life view. With democracy, 
religion was not mandated to influence the legal arena. Inevitably, the 
revering of human life succumbed to political considerations. The 
legalisation of abortion therefore meant that a blind eye was turned to the 
wishes of especially those for whom religion and culture form an integral part 
of their social fabric and lived realities. A reliable, though dated (2003–2006) 
study80, concludes that most South Africans are not only against abortion but 
also viewed it as “wrong”. Du Plessis’ pro-life views lend both voice and 
weight to such a position. 
    This article has highlighted that Du Plessis was able to hold anti-apartheid 
views and play an instrumental role at the coalface of shaping South Africa’s 
first Bill of Rights, while at the same time holding early pro-life views that 
may not have augured well for an assured future pro-abortion law. It is 
therefore contended that, while Sarkin’s criticism of his supervisor may have 
been partly justified, it was probably easier for Sarkin to be able to don a 
constitutional hat to critique Du Plessis’ pro-life view (which appears from 
this article to be decidedly more pro-choice than pro-life) and, furthermore, to 
find legal support for his own pro-choice views in the fact that South African 
law recognises only an unborn as a child or person when it is in fact born 
alive. It is contended that Sarkin’s views may, like Du Plessis’, also have 
been influenced by his own subjectivities, given that he has been described 
as a “leading Jewish intellectual”.81 A valid question to ask therefore is 
whether Sarkin’s rationale for his pro-choice view was entirely uninfluenced 
by the religion that he was born into, or whether it is merely coincidental that 
Jewish law,82 too, deems life to begin with live birth? Moreover, given, too, 
that Jewish law requires only that the unborn should have emerged halfway 
from its mother’s body to be deemed a human, it will be interesting to know 
what Sarkin will make of the fact that with intra-uterine surgery the unborn is 
partially removed from its mother’s body, and may even be returned to it. 
    I also engaged Du Plessis about how he found the experience of 
supervising Sarkin, given the divergency of their views. He was gracious 
enough to admit that, in hindsight, he may have been too hard on Sarkin. I 
believe that, given Du Plessis’ pro-life views and his instrumental role in 
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framing the interim Constitution, and Sarkin’s doctorate favouring pro-choice 
views, that they had lost a golden opportunity to join forces and combine 
their divergent academic views on abortion towards finding a more workable, 
balanced solution for South Africa at the time that it needed expertise, while 
they were best placed to provide it. This was a pity because, as this article 
has highlighted, Du Plessis was able to set his personal views aside when 
they conflicted with his professional interpretations regarding the application 
of the ASA, and to again do so in terms of the pro-choice provisions of the 
Constitution which followed. Their different views may not have been so 
opposed after all. 
    If Du Plessis were asked today to speculate about the beginning of life, he 
may be ambivalent. When I asked Du Plessis whether his earlier-held 
(conservative) views on abortion had changed, and he replied that he was 
not really sure, I was not surprised, because, given that being pro-life does 
not necessarily always have to mean being anti-choice, is evidenced in his 
own more controversial views. His honesty remains humbling and confirms 
for me the wisdom behind an adage that I read somewhere, which goes 
along the lines that “we are often most in the dark when we are the most 
certain, and the most enlightened when we are the most confused”. 
    I contend that it would not have been better, nor would it have mattered, 
had the Constitution, instead of adopting a Solomonic neutral position 
(tantamount to fence-sitting), contained a clear abortion clause which 
guaranteed the right to abortion, given that its emphasis on female 
reproductive rights “locks in” support for abortion. However, this does not 
necessarily imply that a constitutional challenge, which has yet to occur, 
does not stand a chance to amend the status quo to provide protection to an 
unborn. Du Plessis may have written his last word on abortion, but agrees 
that a last word on the contentious topic has yet to be written. 
